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Summary: The fundamental idea we discuss in this paper is that the failure of
Europe to deal with the international crisis is due, first and foremost, to the
deepening of a more specific crisis that affected the very process of European
integration and developed through two main channels: one, broader, linked to
the erosion of the original driving forces underpinning integration in Europe;
another, more circumscribed, linked to the malfunctioning of the euro as an
internal adjustment mechanism of the currency zone. To deal with these struc-
tural dimensions of the crisis, we put forward a model of a Global Europe
against the model of Continental Europe that has dominated the integration 
process until now and in this alternative framework we discuss the potential
role of Portugal and of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. 
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The crisis gripping present day Europe, beyond being a particular expression of the 
more general international crisis, also presents a specific structural dimension that 
has been shaping up for some years and has gained momentum, above all, from an 
inability to respond in a timely way to the factors that caused the asymmetric shock 
which ushered in the so-called sovereign debt crisis. The fundamental idea we dis-
cuss in this paper is that the failure of Europe to deal with the international crisis is 
due, first and foremost, to the deepening of a more specific crisis that affected the 
very process of European integration and developed through two main channels: one, 
broader, linked to the erosion of the original driving forces underpinning integration 
in Europe; another, more circumscribed, linked to the malfunctioning of the euro as 
an internal adjustment mechanism of the monetary zone. After presenting some ref-
erences for the ongoing debate about the crisis in Section 1, we discuss the first 
channel introducing, in Section 2, what we have called the identity crisis of the Euro-
pean integration project. The second channel, the failure of the euro as an adjustment 
mechanism, will be the focus of discussion in Section 3. 
A discussion of the European response to the crisis, in its double dimension, 
will be the focal point of Sections 4 and 5. In Section 6, which is a development of 
the structural approach, we discuss an alternative model to the current dominant view 
of how European integration is shaping up: we put forward a model of a Global 
Europe against a model of Continental Europe that has been dominant until now.   
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Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the discussion with a consideration of the 
potential of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPSC) and the role 
of Portugal in the context of the Atlantic opening scenario that gives support to the 
alternative Global Europe approach. 
 
1. European Crisis and Global Crisis: Recent Discussions 
 
One of the most important dimensions of the global economic and financial crisis 
undoubtedly lies in the debate that has been waging on its causes, about the way the 
contagion developed and how the cross-border transmission mechanism worked. At 
European level the debate has focused on the relationship between the so-called sov-
ereign debt crisis and the functioning (or dysfunctioning) of the euro system, includ-
ing the effects of the lack of the exchange rate mechanism. We would refer, in par-
ticular, the works of Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin (2010), Paul de Grauwe 
(2011), Philip R. Lane (2012), and Michael D. Bordo and Harold James (2013). The 
debate also focused on the relationship between growth and austerity, deserving ref-
erence, for purposes of our own work, the contributions of Carmen M. Reinhart and 
Kenneth S. Rogoff (2010, 2011, 2014), James B. Delong and Lawrence H. Summers 
(2012), Paul R. Krugman (2012), Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012), 
and Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin (2013). And, at a more struc-
tural level, it’s important to refer the discussion on the viability of both the single 
currency and the European Union (EU), in a context of increasing heterogeneity of 
the currency area, increasing asymmetries within the Union and breaking of internal 
political solidarity. An interesting digest of these discussions can be found on two 
publications, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 
2011, 2012), the former dedicated to the responses that have been given, at different 
levels, to the crisis, the later more oriented to the debate on the so-called structural 
reforms. A select set of papers produced by International Monetary Fund (IMF) re-
searchers, analysing the financial crisis, its causes, consequences and policy re-
sponses, both in historical and theoretical perspective, can also be found on Stijn 
Claessens et al. (2014). 
If it is true that several authors point out the specifically global nature of the 
current crisis by focusing on the deeply flawed institutions and practices of what is 
often referred to as the New Financial Architecture (see, e.g. James Crotty 2008; 
Thomas I. Palley 2014), others focus more on the particularities of the European cri-
sis regarding it as a generator of a own and specifically dynamics that is not only at 
origin of the so-called sovereign debt crisis but also relayed to the global crisis, 
deepening it and creating additional factors of instability (Jean-Paul Guichard and 
Antoine Brunet 2009; Eckhard Hein and Achim Truger 2014). Sill others, point out 
the rise of competitive imbalances within European Monetary Union (EMU) coun-
tries due to systemic differences, mainly at the level of wage governance institutions 
(see, Alison Johnston, Bob Hancké, and Suman Pant 2013). 
Analyzing the causes of the specifically European crisis we would refer the 
works of Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Francesco Saraceno (2010), Casimir Dadak (2011), 
Jorge Uxó, Jesús Paúl, and Eladio Febrero (2011), Angelos A. Antzoulatos (2012), 
and Harris Dellas and George S. Tavlas (2012). They discuss the fragilities of the  
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institutional architecture of the EU and the more political than economic based deci-
sion to move to the euro. The global crisis emerges in this context as the detonator 
element of a structural crisis that had long been latent and only waiting the right 
moment to explode. The enlargement to the central and eastern countries acted as an 
enhancer factor of asymmetries and a catalyst of internal contradictions (Irena Rado-
vić 2009). 
Concerning the European Central Bank (ECB) there is a relative consensus on 
the stabilizing role it has played in the crisis management, mostly when it follows the 
way of intervention of its American counterpart, the Fed, trying to act as lender of 
last resort (De Grauwe 2011; Hansjörg Herr 2014). The interventions of the ECB and 
the Fed, principally the so-called ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures, 
avoided the collapse of the financial system by cutting interest rates, relaxing the 
requirements in terms of collaterals and holding financial institutions with insolvency 
problems (see Philippine Cour-Thimann and Bernhard Winkler 2013; Carlo Alta-
villa, Domenico Giannone, and Michele Lenza 2014), but there is still a need for 
more integrated policies in order to take into account the interdependent nature of 
problems (Jay C. Shambaugh 2012). 
However, measures taken to deal with the financial system are far from what 
would be necessary to go to the root of the problems, namely the regulation and su-
pervision deficit (Már Guðmundsson 2011; Christine Cumming 2012) and, above all, 
the lack of a systemic vision of policies and institutions (C. Randall Henning and 
Martin Kessler 2012). On the other hand, we can devise many hesitations and inabil-
ity on the field of the economic policy management that have weakened the sustain-
ability of the timid recover signs. For that reason, the markets continue to believe the 
fracturing of the euro has a material probability (Adrian Blundell-Wignall 2012). At 
a more global level, the spectrum of secular stagnation linked to the prevalence of 
recessive policies concerns a growing number of economists and researchers who 
strive to draw attention to the aggregate demand problem (see Coen Teulings and 
Richard Baldwin 2014). 
Still on this subject it’s important to mention the speeches of the President of 
the ECB, Mario Draghi (2014), and of the Chair of the Fed, Janet L. Yellen (2014), 
made at the Annual Central Bank Symposium in Jackson Hole, Kansas City, on Au-
gust 22
nd, 2014. Both converge on the importance of the non-standard monetary pol-
icy measures to deal with the weakness of the recovery, the high levels of unem-
ployment and the threat of deflation, especially in the euro zone. Yellen emphasizes 
the need for monetary policy to be conducted ultimately in a pragmatic manner, rely-
ing not on a particular indicator or model but reflecting instead an ongoing assess-
ment of a wide range of information in the context of the ever-evolving understand-
ing of the economy. Draghi, in turn, stresses the need for aggregate demand policies 
in order to deal with the prevailing uncertainty and to help insure against the risk of 
hysteresis effects provoked by the weakness of the economy. Going ahead on his 
thinking, the President of the ECB clearly points out to the need for the central bank 
to act as a backstop for government funding, including to ensure both an appropriate 
aggregate position and a large public investment programme in EU. This proposal 
moves forward in line with the more active intervention that has been characteristic  
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of the ECB in the context of the crisis developments and that has been theorized at 
several levels by the ECB staff (see, e.g. Víctor Constâncio 2011; Cour-Thimann and 
Winkler 2013) but also in increasing detuning with the dominant German position as 
expressed by the Deutsche Bundesbank (see Ambreas Dombret 2013). In the debate 
between austerity and growth, the later clearly scores. 
Following previous works (António Mendonça 2006, 2008, 2012), in this pa-
per we want to situate ourselves in this debate adopting the view that the European 
crisis is an expression of the global crisis but, simultaneously, an expression of the 
conjunction of this global crisis with a particular and specifically European crisis of 
structural nature. Of course we have in presence the entire going on discussions but 
we aim to build our own explanatory model by integrating the three dimensions re-
ferred (global, European structural and European cyclical) but also integrating a dis-
cussion about the ways Europe can exit an even more deeper structural crisis that 
affects the more deep dynamics of its own integration project. 
 
2. The Identity Crisis of the European Integration Project 
 
The first channel or component of the structural dimension of the European crisis is 
what we call the identity crisis of the European integration project and this links di-
rectly to the erosion of the original driving forces underpinning the European integra-
tion process (Mendonça 2008, 2012). 
Indeed, from its very first beginning until now, the development of the Euro-
pean integration process was the result of the combined action of two particular dy-
namics. First, an integration-deepening dynamic that drove the participant countries 
from a single form of sectorial integration aiming at the collective and integrated 
management of the coal and steel industries - then the two strategic industries - to the 
sophisticated Monetary and Economic Union of our days, with its target being Politi-
cal Union. Second, an integration-enlargement dynamic, which meant that new 
groups of countries came in, building on the six founders (France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg), and reaching twenty-eight member states to date. 
It is a process that has developed until now on a geographic extension basis, inside 
the boundaries of the European continent, though it looks as if it could break these 
limits with the upcoming prospect of Turkey joining, or even other Asiatic or 
Maghreb countries. It is important to remember, also, as an expression of the positive 
interaction between deepening and enlargement dynamics, that two of the most im-
portant jumps forward of the European integration process have combined, precisely, 
new country membership and qualitative progress in the integration process: the Sin-
gle European Act (entry into force in 1987), with the membership of Portugal and 
Spain; and the Maastricht Treaty (entry into force in 1993), which paved the way for 
the EMU and preceded the adhesion of Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
This reality changed, however, with the specific process that led to the single 
currency. The United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark opted out of membership of 
the euro zone, though for different reasons (but convergent in the sense that they 
didn’t want to share all the common responsibilities of the single currency), and, 
from that moment, the multi-speed Europe institutionalized de facto, notwithstanding 
the possibility of future entry of those countries that did not want to join at the start.  
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In any case, the start of the single currency in these circumstances signalled that the 
European integration process had reached a critical phase, heralding the exhaustion 
of the original reference point - the model established in the Treaty of Rome. Look-
ing back, and weighing up everything that happened to the European economy, both 
on external and internal levels, it is not difficult to accept the hypothesis that it was 
specifically the decision to move to the single currency, without all the requirements 
for an optimal monetary zone, particularly those concerned with the levels of fiscal 
and budget integration, that led to the current asymmetries, hindering (at least until 
the present moment) a coherent strategic answer from the European authorities. 
The later revisions of the Treaty of Rome (Amsterdam and Nice) represent 
less of a “jump forward”, in terms of deepening integration, and more of a defensive 
reaction from dominant countries, faced with the uncertainties and risks that 
stemmed from increased asymmetries and from changes in power relations in the 
Union. This “stagnation” in the plan for deepening integration was a clear expression 
of the exhaustion of the former European integration model and the entry of a new 
phase, which we call the identity crisis of the European integration project. This was 
a particular crisis that became deeper with the failure of the Treaty of the European 
Constitution and its replacement by the Treaty of Lisbon, itself then replaced by the 
new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Mone-
tary Union, which entered into force on January 1
st, 2013, and set the standards for 
those countries that complete the ratification process. 
The interaction between the two dynamics (enlargement and deepening) that 
drove and shaped the development of the integration process in Europe can be better 
understood using the diagram below (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
 
Figure 1  The European Integration Process 
 
The horizontal axis represents the historical development of the European in-
tegration process with its successive enlargements. The vertical axis represents the 
Integration limit
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uniform or inclusive integration-deepening, specifically the process where the suc-
cessive levels of integration development are shared by all member states. The origin 
of the axis, O, is taken as the beginning of the European integration process, with the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. 
The OA line is the 45-degree line of the quadrant and represents the balance 
between the deepening and enlargement dynamics of the integration process. Above 
the 45-degree line, priority is given to the deepening of integration: the deepening 
dynamics outweigh the enlargement dynamics; uniform or inclusive integration pre-
vails. Below the 45-degree line is the opposite: the enlargement dynamics outweigh 
the deepening dynamics, intensifying the asymmetries and creating, as a result, ob-
stacles to the transition to new and more developed levels of integration. 
The OI line represents the path of the integration process. The concave shape 
it assumes results from the interaction between the enlargement and deepening dy-
namics and from the progressive development of a particular trade-off. As the 
enlargement develops, there appear more difficulties with the move to higher levels 
of integration or, simply more difficulties in maintaining the levels already reached. 
We cannot even exclude the hypothesis of integration levels receding, in which case 
the OI line slope becomes negative.   
Between ECSC creation and the introduction of the euro, the deepening dy-
namics clearly outweigh the enlargement dynamics. The central concern of the au-
thorities has been to create all the conditions needed for all the member states to par-
ticipate equally in the move to higher levels of integration. This process is repre-
sented by the OD section of the I curve, above the 45-degree line, OA. 
After the creation of the single currency (represented in the chart by the EE’ 
line), the deepening dynamics run out of steam. The new levels of integration are no 
more shared equally by all member states: the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark 
and Greece, though for different reasons, all stay out. On the other hand, the 
enlargement dynamics accelerate, with twelve more countries coming in. They are 
from Central and Eastern Europe, along with the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus 
and Malta. This brought the number of countries in the EU to twenty-seven (and this 
became twenty-eight after July 1
st, 2013, with the incoming of Croatia). The hetero-
geneous levels of development in these new countries, between them and between 
them all and the old countries, accentuated the difficulty of sharing higher levels of 
integration, above all in terms of the single currency. The single currency vector 
stays out, though participation in the euro zone must occur in timely fashion, given 
the end of the “opt-out” clause. In any case, a two-speed Europe has become institu-
tionalized: there is one zone with more restraints (the single currency zone, or euro 
area); and another broader zone (EU). This new reality is represented in the chart by 
the move of the I curve to the zone below the 45-degree line and by its reduced slope, 
meaning the arrival to a state near stagnation in terms of integration deepening possi-
bility, either as a result of the recent countries coming in, or as a result of anticipate 
future incomings. 
The introduction of the single currency is the critical turning point. It repre-
sents the transition to a high level of economic integration, implying the transfer of 
monetary sovereignty to a supranational Community and the consequent loss of na- 
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tional autonomy of monetary policy. At the same, however, fiscal policy remains at 
national level, albeit formally highly restricted by the terms of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
These restrictions, however, are not real restrictions, for two fundamental rea-
sons: firstly, because they are not based on uniform fiscal conditions - in reality, de-
spite the monetary union, there continues to be a disparity in tax situations, acting as 
instruments of economic competition between countries that belong to the same 
monetary zone, a fact which is counter-intuitive; secondly, because they do not ema-
nate from a situation of symmetry between the economic conditions of different 
countries, and are therefore extremely vulnerable to any disruption of the economic 
cycle, particularly larger ones like those resulting from the current economic and fi-
nancial crisis. These two types of asymmetries produce economic inefficiencies in 
that they hamper the integration of monetary and fiscal policies in a unified monetary 
zone, and may even lead to considerable turmoil, as was the case with the sovereign 
debt crisis. 
Fiscal policy arises in the context of the discussion of optimal currency areas, 
as a key response to asymmetric shocks in the absence of sufficient flexibility of 
wages and prices or factor mobility. However, given the limitations of monetary pol-
icy in the financing of public deficits, fiscal policy also becomes an instrument that is 
at one and the same time extremely sensitive and extremely vulnerable, taking into 
account the rigidity that exists in the structure of public budgets and increased pres-
sure in situations of economic recession. Fiscal policy, which germinates as an essen-
tially anti-cyclical concern, becomes a pro-cyclical instrument in the context of 
monetary union, and its effects have been exacerbated, given the depth of the current 
recession. 
Fiscal integration is a process that evolves according to the circumstances and 
is associated with processes of political unification (Bordo 2004; Bordo, Agnieszka 
Markiewicz, and Lars Jonung 2011). In Europe there is no political unification, nor 
any prospect of this goal being reached in a reasonable time to influence the current 
economic situation, hence the difficulties in advancing towards greater fiscal integra-
tion, either through the strengthening of the Community budget or through the har-
monization of rules. There is no “federal spirit” in Europe, although it could be 
brought about by the need to respond to the crisis. This, however, does not seem to 
be the case in the current euro zone climate. 
Whatever the outcome of the on-going discussions, it would seem that we 
have reached a limit situation where it becomes necessary to take a decision on the 
continuation of the integration process in Europe. And two fundamental hypotheses 
seem to be on the table: 
 
  Either to accept the current situation, and adjust integration to the reality of 
different idiosyncrasies and needs of countries members; 
  Or to keep the current requirements of integration and then accept that 
there will have to be a reduction in the geographical space of their applica-
tion. 
 
In either hypothesis there is a range of possibilities that tend to close as indeci-
sion persists. The first hypothesis will worsen the cost of the chosen solution, and 
that will necessarily require deeper integration in monetary, fiscal, and budgetary  
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and, of course, political aspects, with increased transfer of sovereignty (which cannot 
fail to be considered as a cost). In the second case, the risk of dissolution and even 
disorderly implosion of the euro zone will increase exponentially. 
The arrival of the EU at this critical point is represented in the chart by the bar 
CC’. What is decided will determine the future shape and slope of the curve OI, 
which represents the integration process. 
 
3. The Adjustment Problem in the Euro Zone 
 
The second channel of the European structural crisis has to do with the adjustment 
problem in the euro zone in the presence of fundamental imbalances, either at na-
tional level internally or at the level of international relations. 
Looking back, we can conclude that this mechanism has not only been ineffi-
cient during all the life span of the euro but also, having eased the current account 
constraint, has encouraged the temporal accumulation of cyclical imbalances beyond 
all acceptable limits, giving rise to increasingly explosive situations. 
The accumulation of these macroeconomic imbalances has also given rise to a 
new type of imbalance, this time of a structural nature - the increasing asymmetry 
between the euro zone countries. Far from having produced endogeneity, as the the-
ory would have us believe, the euro area favoured the development of idiosyncrasy 
among the countries that created all the conditions for the eruption of asymmetric 
shocks, and the sovereign debt crisis is the major expression of this (Mendonça, João 
Silvestre, and José Passos 2011). 
To better understand the importance and dimension of the adjustment prob-
lem, we will use the Swan diagram (Trevor Swan 1963; De Grauwe 1989) as pre-
sented below (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
Source: Swan (1963) and De Grauwe (1989). 
 
 
Figure 2  The Adjustment Problem 
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On the vertical axis we represent the real exchange rate R. On the horizontal 
axis we represent the level of total spending (absorption) in the economy D. Two 
equilibrium conditions are represented in the diagram. One, by the line EE (external 
equilibrium), which represents the combinations between real exchange rate and ex-
penditure levels that leave the trade account balanced. The slope of this line is posi-
tive, reflecting the simple idea that an increase in competitiveness (increased R), 
leads to a trade surplus, with the associated increase in domestic expenditure to keep 
the trade account balanced. Thus, the points below the line EE represent external 
deficits situations and the points above the same line represent surplus. 
The line IE represents the other equilibrium condition (domestic equilibrium). 
This line represents the combinations between real exchange rate and expenditure 
levels that ensure an unemployment level corresponding to the so-called natural rate 
of unemployment. The slope of the line is negative, reflecting the idea that increased 
competition leads to increased exports, and this fact, in turn, leads to increased do-
mestic output, reducing unemployment to a level below the natural rate, depressing 
wages and generating inflationary pressures. To keep the balance it becomes neces-
sary, therefore, to reduce spending. Thus, the points below line IE represent unem-
ployment situations and points above the line represent inflation situations. 
By combining imbalances, we can define four standard situations: (i) unem-
ployment with external deficit; (ii) unemployment with surplus; (iii) inflation with 
surplus; (iv) inflation with deficit. The point E - the intersection of the lines - repre-
sents the combination of internal and external balance. 
Consider now two typical imbalance situations: a loss of competitiveness as a 
result of a relative increase in domestic prices (domestic shock); and an increase in 
competitiveness resulting from a relative increase in external prices (external shock). 
 
3.1 Domestic Shock: Loss of Competitiveness 
 
In the diagram, this situation is represented by the shift of the economy from the 
equilibrium point E to point C: the loss of competitiveness generates a decrease in 
exports and an output breakdown with negative consequences in terms of employ-
ment. We reach a situation in which an external deficit is associated with unemploy-
ment above the natural rate. If it is not possible to use the exchange rate mechanism 
(the nominal exchange rate is fixed), rebalancing can only be achieved by a reduction 
in domestic prices. This reduction requires, however, flexibility in prices and wages. 
In this hypothesis, the original discussion supposed the activation of two 
mechanisms. 
First, the rise in unemployment would reduce the level of wages and this re-
duction, in turn, would cause a decline in the price of domestic output. 
Second, the external deficit would force the monetary authorities to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market by selling foreign currency against the local currency. 
As a result, we would have a contraction in the domestic money supply, with rising 
interest rates, reduced domestic spending and, in consequence, a fall in price levels. 
To be effective, this mechanism clearly requires the authorities to let the “rules of the 
game” come into play, i.e. the external deficit is expected to be transmitted to the 
money market.  
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The combined effect of these two mechanisms would lead the economy back 
to point E: increased competitiveness, reduced unemployment, and the deficit would 
be eliminated. The way all this would work is dependent, however, on several factors 
and, in particular, on the speed of adjustment of prices and wages. We could have 
different paths for the restoration of equilibrium. 
But now suppose that prices and wages are not flexible, as the adjustment hy-
pothesis requires. How would the economy behave? 
It is evident that the adjustment mechanism loses effectiveness and we find 
ourselves on the dashed line in the diagram. If the authorities give priority to unem-
ployment, increasing spending, the economy moves to the right along the line, in-
creasing the external deficit. If the authorities give priority to reducing the external 
deficit, cutting spending, the economy moves to the left, increasing unemployment. 
The authorities have fallen into the so-called Meade dilemma (James E. Meade 
1951): if they reduce the external deficit, they increase unemployment; if they reduce 
unemployment, they increase the external deficit. 
We thus come to the inevitable conclusion about the essence of the problem of 
adjustment in a context of price and wage rigidities. Whatever the choice of the au-
thorities (reduction of unemployment or reduction in the external deficit), the re-
course to devaluation becomes a necessity and, inevitably, ends up happening. If the 
option is the reduction of unemployment, the accumulation of external deficits be-
comes untenable for the simple reason that the exhaustion of foreign exchange acts 
as a limit to this policy. Similarly, the option of reducing the external deficit is faced 
with the social and political limits of internal deflation, leading the authorities to opt 
for the “lesser evil” of devaluation.  
In summary, the exchange rate is an alternative to sticky prices and wages that 
characterizes most developed economies, in particular within the euro zone. Obvi-
ously, we are reasoning under extreme assumptions and, in reality, several variants 
may exist regarding the rigidity of prices and wages. But the essence of the problem 
does not change. 
But how are things supposed to work in the absence of the exchange rate 
mechanism, as is the case of the euro zone? 
The answer brings us to another type of problem that has to do with verifica-
tion of the optimality conditions of the currency area. According to the theory of op-
timum currency areas, it is necessary to verify at least one of three conditions so that 
we can dispense the use of the exchange rate instrument in the adjustment process: 
flexibility of prices and wages; financial transfers to the countries / regions affected 
by asymmetric shocks; and factor mobility between countries / regions, particularly 
regarding labour. 
But consider also a particular hypothesis: the relaxation of the balance of 
payments constraint through the use of external financing. 
In the situation described for point C in the diagram, the economy could over-
come the problem of loss of competitiveness and continue to ignore the pressure of 
the external deficit by recourse to external financing. External financing would work 
as a substitute for foreign exchange reserves, allowing the postponement of adjust-
ment beyond any limit.  
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The disappearance of the balance of payments constraint, or exchange restric-
tions, considered one of the benefits of the participation in the single currency, ended 
up working in a perverse way, acting as a factor in building up imbalances beyond 
what would be possible if there were a national currency. In a situation of effective 
economic and monetary integration, with fiscal integration and effective political 
solidarity, the problem would be considered as internal to the monetary area and 
solved as such. In a context of incomplete monetary integration - as is the case of the 
euro area - the deepening of inequalities, as a result of the successive enlargements, 
and the weakening - or even loss - of a political common denominator, as a result of 
the assertion of a particular hegemony, the disappearance of the balance of payments 
constraint, which would have been a factor favouring structural convergence and 
deepening integration, in a theoretical framework, ended up working as a magnifica-
tion factor of asymmetry, turning a crisis of the euro system as a whole into a sover-
eign debt asymmetric shock. 
But this is only one side of the problem. It is important to consider the other 
side, the competitiveness gain. 
 
3.2 External Shock: Competitiveness Gain 
 
In the diagram, this is represented by the shift of the economy from equilibrium 
situation E to D: the gain in competitiveness, as a result of the relative increase in 
external prices, produces a trade balance surplus and unemployment below the natu-
ral rate. 
In a conventional situation, the same two channels allow the economy go back 
to equilibrium. 
First, an unemployment rate below the natural rate produces a rise in wages 
and, in this way, a rise in domestic prices.  
Second, the external surplus forces the monetary authorities to buy foreign 
currency against the local currency, increasing the stock of money in circulation.  
As a result, spending increases, and this also contributes to the rise in prices. 
Note that in this case it is assumed that the monetary authorities follow the “rules of 
the game” by not sterilizing the monetary effects of the external surplus. 
The combined effect of these two mechanisms will bring the economy back to 
point E. The economy loses competitiveness, employment will be reduced to levels 
consistent with the natural rate and the external surplus will be eliminated. 
In comparison with the former situation of competitiveness loss, in this case 
there is an easier operation for the adjustment mechanism. This is the result of the 
greater flexibility of prices and wages to a rise than to a fall. Theoretically there is an 
asymmetry in the operation of the adjustment mechanism, as the economy faces a 
problem of external deficit or surplus differently, the second case being less trouble-
some to deal with. But, in reality, everything can be very different. 
In the hypothesis of exchange rate existence, the authorities may pursue a pol-
icy of price stability, sterilizing the monetary effects of the external surplus, thus 
preventing the second mechanism from working. Regarding the first mechanism, it 
can be prevented from working by resorting to revaluation of the exchange rate 
bringing the economy back to point E and without causing domestic prices to rise.  
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But how do things work in the absence of a national currency and thus in a 
context where it is impossible to use the foreign exchange instrument as an adjust-
ment variable? 
It is obvious that the imbalance can only be corrected if there is an increase in 
domestic spending. This will lead to rising domestic prices and competitiveness loss 
(lower R). But here too we face the question of priority to price stability. If the au-
thorities are reluctant to accept inflation, they simply impede the working of this 
mechanism through restrictive policies, contributing to the maintenance of the imbal-
ance. They may even accept a reduction in employment to levels more compatible 
with the natural rate, pushing the economy to a situation close of the one represented 
by line IE in the diagram. This is a situation where everything is easier than in the 
case of competitiveness loss. 
Let’s now combine the two situations in the context of a single currency area. 
On one side we see an accumulation, beyond all bounds, of the imbalances resulting 
from competitiveness loss: unemployment and external deficit. On the other side, we 
see an accumulation of the imbalances of opposite sign: labour shortage and external 
surplus. In the absence of an exchange rate instrument, fulfilment of optimality con-
ditions of the currency area, and in presence of resistance to competitiveness loss on 
the part of the surplus economy, the tendency will be for an adjustment by the 
weaker side, i.e. through the contraction of spending in the less competitive econ-
omy, thus reducing internal prices and restoring competitiveness. 
This is, in general terms, what is supposed to be happening with the present 
adjustment within the euro zone, between the surplus countries, with Germany at the 
head, and indebted and deficit countries, including Portugal. The stronger side coun-
tries could do the adjustment, if they accept a loss of competitiveness. Because they 
do not accept, the adjustment has to be done by the weaker side, and they must bear 
unilaterally the consequences of restrictive policies. 
We should, however, consider other consequences of unilateral adjustment by 
deficit countries. 
As seen before, in the context of the Meade dilemma, the external rebalancing 
priority produces a rise in unemployment. However, the adjustment by means of 
spending cuts implies the hypothesis of flexible wages and prices. The rise in unem-
ployment to very high levels creates the conditions for a wage reduction, which, in 
the reference theoretical framework, will act as a competitiveness recovery factor via 
the effects on prices. 
The reality, however, is more complex than the mechanism described here. 
Firstly, the impact of wage reduction on the fall in prices is not linear and depends on 
many factors related with the structural characteristics of the deficit economy. More-
over, in a context of deep recession, it is not expected that lower wages, by them-
selves, can work as an increase employment factor. On the contrary, it can work as 
an additional factor of increased unemployment through reduction of spending and 
consumption. In this respect we would like to bring in here the results of a study on 
the effects of changes in unit labour costs on economic dynamism (Mendonça and 
Passos 2013). This study concluded, with reference to a panel of 32 OECD countries 
for the period 1993-2009 that these effects are not significant and, moreover, are not 
symmetrical. Economic activity, measured by exports and output, seems to react  
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negatively to a rise in unit labour costs, but the reverse reaction does not seem to ex-
ist when we are in the presence of a fall in labour costs. This reflects a transmission 
chain effect more complex than that considered by the theory. 
In summary, the euro system throughout its existence has proved be deeply in-
efficient in terms of internal adjustment, revealing that it is not an entirely credible 
substitute for the traditional foreign exchange instrument. Not only has it allowed for 
the accumulation of imbalances over time, which turned into structural asymmetries 
between economies and countries - as we saw in the current financial and economic 
crisis; it has also proved unable to respond effectively - as an internal adjustment 
mechanism - to the disruptions provoked by the impact of this same crisis in its own 
area. 
The sovereign debt crisis is just one of the dimensions of the malfunctioning 
of the euro area. Not only by letting things run on but, by letting countries be ex-
posed as autonomous entities, as if they still had their own economic policy instru-
ments to be used, the euro zone brought into play centrifugal forces that could well 
jeopardize the very existence of the currency zone, at least in the way it was built. 
 
4. The European Response to the International Crisis 
 
Despite all the hesitations, the euro zone was forced to confront its own structural 
weaknesses and took some initiatives that sought to meet solutions to deal with the 
problems of adjustment. Regardless of the results already reached, it is a process that 
has dragged on painfully and in zigzags, being once again determined by the interests 
of the dominant economies, Germany in first place. In fact, despite all the weak-
nesses of the single currency architecture highlighted throughout the development of 
the so-called sovereign debt crisis, the spirit of national policies interests was main-
tained and, perhaps, reinforced continuing to rely on any idea of ensuring overall 
consistency and responsiveness in the single currency system. 
Here it is important to highlight three key decisions: (a) the revision of the 
Lisbon Treaty, with the signing in early March 2012 of the new Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the EMU (TSCG); (b) the creation of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM); (c) ECB opening up to the use of so-called unconven-
tional measures of monetary policy. Together, they constitute a package whose com-
prehensive coherence and potential effectiveness in preventing and responding to 
economic imbalances in the euro area should be examined.  
 
4.1 The New Treaty 
   
The so-called “fiscal compact” is the substantial part of the new treaty and defines 
the rules to be applied in managing the deficit and debt: 0.5% of structural deficit, 
compulsory debt reduction at a 1/20 average annual rate, structural reform pro-
grammes for indebted countries, penalties for non-compliant countries, and European 
ex-ante macroeconomic coordination enhancement. 
Also with the aim of strengthening the coordination of economic policies and 
convergence, the treaty includes provisions for the commitment of different countries 
to the smooth functioning of Economic and Monetary Union, notably through ex- 
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ante discussion and coordination of major reforms to be implemented within each 
country individually considered. This discussion should involve the Community in-
stitutions themselves. 
The new treaty has intergovernmental features to facilitate its adoption by the 
signatory countries and seeks to deepen the Stability and Growth Pact, setting tighter 
rules for the management of fiscal policy. This is part of a particular view that con-
siders what is important in the current situation is to give signs to markets of com-
mitment to limiting behaviours, transferring responsibilities for the crisis to country 
level. In this sense the treaty has, primarily, a preventive and deterrent character that 
cannot in any way, be regarded as an answer to current problems. On the contrary, it 
can in the short term accentuate the contraction dynamics of the European economy. 
 
4.2 The European Stability Mechanism 
 
The decision to create the European Stability Mechanism was taken at the European 
summit of December 7, 2010, assuming the tasks of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) to provide 
financial assistance to member states of the euro whenever necessary. It stayed under 
wraps, however, pending the conclusion of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance EMU to finally see the light of day on February 2, 2012. The ESM and 
TSCG are complementary: financial assistance requires adherence to TSCG. Taken 
together, they can be viewed as instruments for strengthening economic coordination 
within Economic and Monetary Union to prevent and cope with crisis situations such 
as that currently faced within the euro zone. 
The ESM has the status of an international financial institution and its mission 
is to raise funds and provide stability support to member countries facing financing 
problems. This support is subject to strict conditionality, according to the chosen fi-
nancial instrument. For this purpose, the ESM is authorized to raise funds by issuing 
financial instruments or by agreements or other financial arrangements with ESM 
members, financial institutions or other third parties. 
The European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, negotiates the condition-
ality of support. The aid application gives rise to a Memorandum of Understanding 
that includes the terms of conditionality that accompanies the instrument of financial 
assistance. These terms reflect, in turn, the seriousness of the problems that gave rise 
to this request for help. It is for these two institutions, where possible in conjunction 
with the IMF, to monitor compliance with agreed conditionality.  
Note that, within the ESM, the need for close collaboration with the IMF is of-
ficially recognized. The countries requesting financial assistance under the ESM are 
expressly advised to submit an identical request to the IMF. Provision is thus what 
has been the practice in the case of the sovereign debt crisis, where there has been a 
refusal to see the financial problems of euro member countries as a matter for the 
whole currency area, even with the argument that the international financial markets 
need to be mobilized. 
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4.3 The “Non-Standard” Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank 
 
The third component of the European response to the crisis has a more practical di-
mension and immediate effects and concerns the intervention of the ECB. 
Since the end of 2011, the ECB has been pushing down interest rates and re-
sponding to liquidity problems with an additional set of financing measures that, at a 
minimum, can be considered unconventional in terms of the practice and culture of 
its own monetary policy management. The main rate of interest is currently 0.5%, 
and since the end of 2011, the ECB has injected all the liquidity necessary to manage 
the problems of bank financing and the needs of sovereign debts management. Si-
multaneously, the ECB decided to decrease the reserve ratio from 2% to 1% and ease 
its collateral acceptance conditions. In practical terms, we can consider that the ECB 
has adopted behaviour of lender of last resort although it has not assumed this as re-
gards commitments to price stability. On the contrary, the whole argument goes to-
wards justifying the non-standard measures with the need to ensure the functioning 
of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (see, in particular, Constâncio 
2011; Cour-Thimann and Winkler 2013).  
In reality, given the current crisis, there are economies facing a liquidity short-
fall problem that cannot be solved merely through the normal functioning of financial 
markets. There is a need for ECB intervention in order to assure that liquidity reaches 
the economy, in a context where there is no danger of inflation and the rate of inter-
est has lost effectiveness. The unconventional measures are justified, given the lost of 
effectiveness of traditional monetary policy and the need to make a by-pass around 
the disruptions of the financial system as a whole. In accordance with this view, the 
ECB reinforced its intervention in 2012 and 2013, notably with the launch of the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program, in an attempt to offset the reces-
sionary effects of austerity policies and increase the room for manoeuver as countries 
came to grips with the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
4.4. Effects on the Structural Crisis Mechanisms 
 
In the table below (Table 1) we summarize the effects of the three key decisions dis-
cussed above over the two main channels of development of the structural crisis in 
Europe. A positive sign (+) means a positive contribution to the problems resolution. 
A negative sign () means a negative contribution. A positive and a negative sign 
together (+ ) mean an undetermined effect. One or two signs (positive or negative) 
serve to quantify the relative magnitude of the effects. 
 
Table 1   Effects on the Structural Crisis 
 
  Identity crisis  Adjustment mechanism of the euro 
New treaty       
ESM   +  + 
Non-standard monetary policy  + +  + 
 
Source: Author. 
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The new treaty is, in our view, the most disruptive decision in that it is a po-
tential amplifier of asymmetries and, consequently, it contributes to the reversal of 
endogeneity in the euro currency area. The overall effect is to enhance the multiform 
integration dynamics, including the possibility of disintegration.  
On the opposite side, we have the non-standard monetary policy of the ECB. 
The effect of what is effectively the bank acting as lender of last resort has been to 
limit the most negative effects of the crisis and widening the scope for national poli-
cies.  
The effects of the ESM are more undetermined though potentially positive in 
terms of euro zone internal adjustment. 
The overall effect of the European response to the crisis is clearly undeter-
mined to date. The structural crisis dynamics have not been yet reversed or even con-
tained and continue developing. 
 
5. The Development of the Structural Crisis in Europe 
   
With regard to Europe’s own specific European structural crisis, developments in the 
international crisis and contradictions in the European response to the local effects 
have combined to push the integration process to a higher critical stage of trade-off 
between Continental enlargement and integration-deepening dynamics. 
The first critical stage was reached, as we have already discussed, with the 
United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden opting out of the euro zone. This, in prac-
tice, instituted a multi-speed Europe and broke with the principles of inclusion and 
uniformity in the path to integration. It also opened up the possibility of having a 
regression in the level of integration, and ultimately the possibility of exclusion from 
the euro zone if the countries concerned do not reach compliance with agreed princi-
ples and rules, such as those which arise from the application of the Stability and 
Growth Pact or those resulting from the latest requirements in the new Treaty on Sta-
bility, Coordination and Governance in the EMU. 
It should be noted, by the way, that monetary integration has always been one 
of the greatest generators of centrifugal forces, demanding more complex resolution 
throughout the history of European integration. Also during the term of the Bretton 
Woods system, the development of German economic hegemony in the European 
context and its preferred alignment with the United States limited the potential of the 
European Payments Union as the embryo of an independent European monetary sys-
tem. In the context of the international monetary system crisis, European monetary 
snakes always clashed in their operation with asymmetries and different priorities in 
economic policy between the different participating countries. They really did not 
work as factors of increased monetary integration and, finally, ran into the sand. And 
the very birth of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 occurred without the 
effective participation of the United Kingdom, despite its participation in the joint 
project of integration since 1973. Interestingly, the EMS resisted the crisis of the 
early 90s crisis with the introduction of greater flexibility through the widening of 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) fluctuation margins to ± 15%, becoming, in 
practice, its opposite - that is, a system of ultra flexible exchange rates. In fact, this 
helped respond to the asymmetries between countries, facilitating differentiated ad- 
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justments - a thing that today would prove to be impossible. It is not surprising there-
fore that the monetary vector continues to be a source of instability and production of 
increased difficulties in the current phase of the European integration process. 
The passage to a second critical stage of the trade-off, in turn, was a direct 
consequence of the changes introduced by the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. It starts 
with German reunification in 1990, even before the euro, but it starts to have a real 
impact with the enlargement, from 2004 onwards, to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, setting a new community economic space, qualitatively very differ-
ent from the previous - a space with substantially expanded asymmetry, leading to 
the displacement of old axes of economic and political interests and the creation of 
new ones, enhancing the basis for internal disagreements. This in fact came about, 
thereby introducing additional factors of instability and locking out endogeneity of 
the integration process. 
The development of centrifugal forces in Europe, caused by the greater size 
and diversity of the space of integration, was magnified by all the events triggered by 
the eruption of the international financial and economic crisis, pushing the trade-off 
enlargement-deepening feature to a third stage of action, where the very functioning 
of the European institutions begins to skid. This is particularly visible in: (1) a loss of 
initiative and power in the face of national interventions, especially from Germany; 
(2) the start of disharmony or even contradiction, as is the case of the European 
Commission and the ECB; (3) an abdication of their own capacity and autonomy in 
the international crisis context, with the request for IMF involvement in the design of 
the adjustment programmes of member countries which, in principle, should have 
been an internal affair of the euro zone.  
The erosion of the role and importance of European institutions goes parallel 
with the strengthening of German hegemony, as it has increasingly imposed its vi-
sion of the European project and has overridden the so-called Franco-German axis 
that shaped the current configuration of the Union. We can clearly see a process in-
volving the adumbration of a union of Northern countries, pushing aside a number of 
Southern countries, forced into asymmetric economic adjustment processes, heavily 
penalizing their economic activity and their ability to assert themselves within the 
euro zone. At the same time, the United Kingdom has strengthened its position as an 
outsider, looking at Europe increasingly as a commercial zone and less as a common 
place or a community that shares broader economic and political goals. The chosen 
model seems, in this case, increasingly outside Europe and more on a transoceanic 
global scale in the space where the United Kingdom built its historical and traditional 
political and economic links. 
If we go back to the central question of the identity crisis in the European in-
tegration project, we need to ask seriously if the uniform and inclusive dynamics are 
still driving the integration process or if this process is already being conditioned and 
shaped in its development by distinct dynamics. Our hypothesis is that we are already 
in the presence of new dynamics and, in contrast to what has gone before, what is 
driving the process now is Multiform or exclusive integration dynamics.  
Returning to Figure 1 above, we can represent the way the European integra-
tion process (OI) has progressed in the period following the crisis (represented by the  
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bar CC’) by a change in the slope of the curve: the horizontality condition would 
seem to have been exhausted, and is on the verge of moving from a positive to a 
negative slope. In other words, everything seems to indicate that the current configu-
ration of the EU economy, and its foreseeable developments, has ceased to be com-
patible with a shift to deeper common levels of integration, favouring instead the 
production of Multiform or exclusive integration dynamics. Nor can we exclude re-
gression shifts in this plan, including the implosion of the entire system if the current 
financial and economic crisis deepens and austerity policies, currently underway, 
prove impractical. 
 
6. The Crisis and the Scenarios for Development of the 
European Integration Project 
 
Given what has been said, how can we foresee the future of the EU and of the euro 
zone in particular? Many authors have tried to answer this question but there is no 
consensus about the way Europe can face its current dilemmas. There seems to be 
greater convergence around the diagnosis than around the possible ways out (Kosta 
Josifidis, Alpar Lošonc, and Novica Supić 2010). Without claiming to give definitive 
answers, because the current situation is far from having exhausted all its possible 
developments, we believe that some hypotheses for the move towards integration in 
Europe can be formulated. We are convinced, however, that whatever effectively 
happens will be largely determined by developments in the European and the euro 
crisis. 
In any case, if we are trying to understand the current driving forces, it is pos-
sible to set out two major hypotheses or scenarios as a framework in which the inte-
gration process in Europe could evolve: a continuity or a doing as usual scenario and 
a reconfiguration scenario. Each of these two scenarios may be open to several sub-
scenarios, or even variants. 
The first scenario assumes that continuity will be the main driving force, even 
though it may entail situations of serious rupture. It assumes the maintenance of ex-
isting policies, and possibly some institutional adjustment in order to consolidate the 
current balance of powers in Europe. It could, however, accept deep changes in the 
shape of the euro currency area and the EU, depending on how the crisis evolves. 
In an optimistic variant, Europe can overcome the crisis. The new mecha-
nisms, created in the meantime, play their part, the euro keeps running, the banking 
union comes into operation, the public debts or, at least, some part of them are 
pooled through the issuance of Eurobonds, fiscal consolidation takes place concomi-
tantly with growth, and the federal and political union project is taken up again. At 
the same time, the enlargement process continues, on a continental geographical ba-
sis, with the incorporation of other European countries that are not yet part of the EU, 
possibly with some extensions beyond the Asiatic frontier of Europe. The relation-
ship with Russia is the great unknown in this scenario and it can change it radically.  
Even though we may witness the “good behaviour” of all the variables in-
volved, it is a scenario that does not exclude the transition to a new phase of the inte-
gration process, moving towards Exclusionary or multiform integration. In this con- 
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text, German hegemony is likely to be consolidated, directly or via a hard core (with 
or without the participation of France), and this will increasingly tend to establish the 
operating rules of the Union and decide the inclusion or exclusion of different coun-
tries. It is a scenario that goes well with the rules of the new Treaty on Stability, and 
the Fiscal Compact, in particular, accepting the hypothesis of “detachment” of coun-
tries, which could go as far as altering the configuration of the Union and its relation-
ship with the euro zone. In any case, there is now a recentering process with the EU 
expanding eastwards, and this means that the concept of Western Europe - which 
worked as the fundamental reference for the building of the European integration 
project - is definitely on the wane. This scenario, naturally, implies a dilution of the 
objectives and the references hitherto existing, with new ones added, and the coun-
tries on the Atlantic western fringe of Europe becoming increasingly peripheral, the 
extreme case being Portugal. This scenario assumes that the original European inte-
gration process will mesh with the new dynamics, resulting from German reunifica-
tion and EU enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
In a pessimistic variant, this scenario implies a rupture with the traditional 
model, with a shift from the “detachment” stage to the institutionalization de jure of 
multi-speed Europe. Here, the implosion hypothesis cannot be excluded, at least at 
the level of the single currency zone. This variant implies the replacement of the 
principle of collective responsibility by the principle of asymmetrical adjustment, 
favouring a decline in the levels of convergence and cohesion. It is a scenario that 
will gain momentum in a context of deepening crisis, the decline of Europe in the 
global economy and the increasing asymmetries between Germany and the “Northern 
countries”, on one side, and the “Southern countries”, on the other. In an even more 
pessimistic version, this scenario may evolve into a complete reverse of the European 
integration process, with greater or lesser fragmentation, but in any case, with a loss 
of power in the traditional European supranational institutions. Compared with the 
optimistic variant, this pessimistic variant assumes the failure of the on-going poli-
cies in Europe, with the deepening of the economic crisis, the enhancing of conflicts 
and the pushing of countries to extreme situations of total inability to deal with the 
internal problems in the framework of the constraints and rules governing the rela-
tions in the EU and in the euro zone. It is a situation in which the costs of staying in 
the Union and in the euro outweigh the benefits, and it becomes impossible, objec-
tively, for the weaker member states to stay in. In a very negative variant we can ex-
pect the implosion of the system. In a less negative variant, we can expect a separa-
tion, a downgrade, or an organized dissolution. 
The second main scenario assumes a deep reconfiguration of the integration 
model and requires a reorientation of the integration project towards the abandon-
ment of the exclusive model of Continental enlargement in order to integrate a dif-
ferent perspective: the projection of Europe in the global world based on a valuation 
and empowerment of the historical relations the Europeans built in their expansion 
across the Atlantic Ocean. This is a new perspective that favours an alternative ap-
proach. It represents an opening of Europe to the global economy, to the detriment of 
an old perspective that has privileged a continental view of Europe turned in on it-
self.   
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In this second main scenario, having in mind the fundamental objective of 
Economic and Monetary Union, the enlargement of the EU should consider in first 
place the effects on the consolidation of the euro zone, which implies, in the current 
situation, the priority to the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis and the effective 
functioning of the euro area as a single currency monetary area, i.e. as a currency 
area where there is a central bank that acts as a lender of last resort, and active poli-
cies that promote growth, employment and economic convergence, besides price sta-
bility and response mechanisms to asymmetric shocks. It implies, ultimately, a redes-
ign of the euro system that may recover the perspective of internal economic conver-
gence and reconcile it with the general objectives of currency area consistency. The 
scenario also assumes an active policy of expansion of the euro as an international 
currency, starting with the strengthening of the economic relations of the European 
countries with their traditional areas of influence outside Europe through the consoli-
dation and diversification of cooperation experiences. It is a scenario in which the 
opening of the European integration process to other geographic areas is considered 
in terms of key strategic objectives, specifically through the establishment of free 
trade areas, the launching of limited economic integration spaces and strengthening 
of monetary cooperation in general. This seems to be in line with the recent perspec-
tive of building the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, between the EU 
and the United States. But is still too early to draw definitive conclusions. We need 
to see the final architecture and above all how it will work. 
It is not difficult to see that this scenario does not contemplate the existence of 
a political-economic hegemony but rather a broadly-based autonomy among the 
countries that integrate the Union and the euro area when it comes to building new 
spaces for cooperation and, possibly for economic integration of a new type. Accord-
ingly, the objectives of political unification in Europe must be seen from a minimalist 
and pragmatic perspective. All attempts at hegemony over European affairs by a re-
stricted group of countries should be rejected. There should instead be a global strat-
egy built on the integration of the strategic interests of the different countries in the 
Union. 
The “softly-softly” approach to political integration, as considered in this sce-
nario, is not in fact incompatible with higher levels of economic integration. Indeed, 
the consolidation of the euro zone and its use as an anchor for the opening up of 
Europe to the world requires a deepening of economic integration, particularly in 
terms of fiscal and macroeconomic policy management. This, in turn, must be recon-
ciled with greater flexibility of policy management at countries level. 
We have chosen the term Atlantic opening for this second scenario, in contrast 
to the first scenario, termed Continental enlargement. It dovetails more closely with 
the current trends of international economic integration that link to form economic 
areas of increased global vocation and tend to overlap increasingly the dynamics of 
regional integration. These trends seem to manifest themselves, particularly, in the 
case of the Anglo-Saxon bloc, formed by the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where factors of historical, cultural and linguis-
tic proximity seem to foster the building of a common attitude in the context of on-
going global economic integration, with visible consequences in the attitude of the 
United Kingdom towards the project of European integration.  
563  The European Crisis and Global Economy Dynamics: Continental Enlargement versus Atlantic Opening 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2014, 5, Special Issue, pp. 543-569
This is also a scenario that requires an appreciation of the geographical loca-
tions of countries, like Portugal and Spain, which are considered in light of current 
references as being on the periphery of European interests. These countries shaped 
their identities also outside Europe, building and projecting at the same time new 
relations with other continents and realities. The peripheral status they have now in 
the context of European integration, especially following enlargement to Central and 
Eastern Europe, could eventually become central in the new context of the Atlantic 
opening that would underpin the building of a Global Europe as opposed to the 
Europe that arises from the first scenario. 
In the diagram below we try to systematize the discussion made above about 
the hypothetical scenarios depicting what we have called the identity crisis of the 
European integration project. In each quadrant we represent a possible stage in the 
integration process, starting with the current Economic and Monetary Union (Figure 
3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
 
Figure 3  Future Scenarios of the Identity Crisis 
 
The vertical axis represents the qualitative development of the integration 
process. The upper half-axis represents Uniform or inclusive integration. The lower 
half-axis represents Multiform or exclusive integration. Notice that when considering 
the possibility that the scenario will evolve into a process of Multiform or exclusive 
integration, this does not necessarily means a downgrade of the levels of joint inte-
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gration already achieved (although this could happen) but a differentiated progress to 
higher levels. In other words, it does not mean a replacement of integration by disin-
tegration but a replacement of Uniform integration dynamics by multiform integra-
tion dynamics. 
On the horizontal axis, there is a representation of the enlargement process of 
the space of integration. Two alternatives are considered: the Continental enlarge-
ment strategy, dominant until now, represented in the right half-axis; and the Atlantic 
opening strategy, represented in the left half of the axis. Also in this case, it should 
be noted that the Atlantic opening option does not necessarily imply an abandonment 
of European geographical integration or even a regression in the current spatial limits 
of integration, but rather a change in terms of strategic options: priority should be 
given to developing relations with other areas outside the European geographical 
area. 
Combining the dynamics represented on the axis, two by two, we can bring 
out the scenarios discussed earlier. 
In the first quadrant there appears the scenario Economic and Monetary Un-
ion, resulting from the action of the binomial Continental enlargement - Uniform or 
inclusive integration. It is the scenario that fits the European integration process up to 
the creation of the euro and from which the identity crisis of the European integration 
project has stemmed. It is still the scenario of the current euro system crisis.  
In the fourth quadrant there is a combination of the forces of the binomial 
Continental enlargement - Multiform or uniform integration to bring out the scenario 
of Continental Europe. It is the “development through continuity” scenario, which 
may have optimistic and pessimistic variants, as discussed earlier. It represents the 
way out of the crisis by extending the current trends of Continental enlargement with 
hegemony of the German or Franco-German centre. It is also the multi-speed Europe 
scenario with a tendency to form a “centre-periphery” opposition within the Union. 
Ultimately, it is a scenario that could bring about the reversal of the integration proc-
ess in Europe, either by the formation of a strong core with Germany as the he-
gemon, standing out from the others, or by paving the way to implosion of the EU. In 
any case, it is a scenario that implies the utter exhaustion of the original driving 
forces of European integration. 
In the third quadrant are the forces of the binomial Atlantic opening - Multi-
form or exclusive integration, the scenario we have termed Global Europe I. It repre-
sents the opening of the European integration process to other geographic areas in the 
context of a multicentre, plural Europe, bereft of hegemony. It is a scenario that im-
plies a reconfiguration of the euro system, with greater flexibility, greater adaptabil-
ity to the asymmetries between countries and greater efficiency as an adjustment 
mechanism for internal imbalances. It is also a scenario that assumes a dynamic en-
hancing of the euro as an international currency, functioning as an anchor for open-
ing up the EU.  
Finally, in the second quadrant, there are the combined forces of the binomial 
Atlantic opening - Uniform or inclusive integration, leading to the Global Europe II. 
It is a higher stage of development in the Global Europe scenario. Europe can assert 
itself as the “core” of global economic integration. The euro becomes an interna-
tional currency alongside the dollar at the same time as it becomes a reference for  
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other currencies or currency areas outside Europe. The big difference between this 
and the scenario in the third quadrant lies in the development of political institutions 
of the EU that adjust to the strategy of Atlantic opening, excluding hegemonies made 
up of countries or blocs and favouring the production of an effective common Euro-
pean interest.  
Viewed dynamically, these four scenarios can be considered as phases in the 
progress of the European integration process, including adjustment to the new condi-
tions of economic globalization. This process can be summarized as: an early stage 
of development leading to the Economic and Monetary Union; an exhaustion phase 
of the original driving forces that led to the identity crisis and generated the dynamics 
of Continental Europe; a phase of strategic reconfiguration leading to Atlantic open-
ing; and finally, a fourth phase that may give rise to a Global Europe, open to the 
world and driver of international economic integration. The arrows in the diagram 
indicating the passage from one quadrant to the following represent this evolutionary 
interpretation. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks: Atlantic Opening and the Potential of 
the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries 
 
Portugal is one of the countries that are setting a lot of store on achieving the Atlantic 
opening scenario, taking into account the potential of its relations within the CPSC 
(Mendonça 2006). Seen from one angle, Portugal is faced with the prospect of be-
coming ever more peripheral, with the economic and political subordination implied 
in the scenario of Continental enlargement. Given this, it has decided advantages in 
being a member of an organisation of countries in an economic space with global 
features, as the CPSC undoubtedly is. A scenario of greater openness of Europe to 
the dynamics of the global economy could produce a recentralization of the country 
within the EU and lead to a status of prime importance in the relationships of Europe 
with the economic areas of which the countries of the CPSC are a part. 
The first feature to be explored in the CPSC is precisely its vocation as a 
player in the global economy (see Figure 4 below). Indeed, it is a community of 
countries spread across five continents, with a combined population that exceeds 250 
million people. All countries, without exception, are a product of the globalization 
process, and one of them - Portugal - is at the very origin of globalization. 
The first major challenge for the CPSC is thus to build a space with a collec-
tive identity, endowed with self-awareness of its joint economic value potential and 
keen to find platforms to realize this potential. In the global economy as it is, the ex-
istence of expanded spaces of collective identity is a key driver to produce central-
ities and dynamics of attraction and anchorage of economic interests. This necessar-
ily involves institutional progress and a common strategy of intervention in interna-
tional organizations, economic but also political, military and others. This joint af-
firmation strategy does not necessarily clash with belonging to other regions of inte-
gration and may represent a particular vector of global relationship of these same 
spaces, overcoming the current limitations of this type of integration and giving each 
participating country additional instruments for insertion in the global economy. 
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Source: Author. 
 
 
Figure 4  The CPSC in the Global Economy 
 
There is also a second dimension to what that the CPSC can provide: the in-
troduction of a scale factor in terms of international relations of each country, con-
sidered individually and as a member of the community. Effectively, the second ma-
jor challenge facing the CPSC is to be able to integrate the particularities and strate-
gic interests of each member country in a collective stance that empowers the com-
munity in the global economy.  
A key factor of global identity acquisition and size appreciation of the group is 
the defence and promotion of the common language. This issue connects with the 
third dimension that the CPSC can enhance: specificity.  In the phase of uniform 
globalization, the specificity factor acquires a new significance and can be instru-
mental in creating conditions attractive to international business flows and, simulta-
neously, in creating vectors of competitive empowerment of countries or groups of 
countries. It will have to start from revisiting and upgrading the values that derive 
from common history and language, from a distinct geographical situation pool, from 
the existence of a consolidated framework of institutional relations, from a develop-
ing process of economic integration and from what is already and can become even 
more extensive political cooperation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
567  The European Crisis and Global Economy Dynamics: Continental Enlargement versus Atlantic Opening 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2014, 5, Special Issue, pp. 543-569
References  
 
Altavilla, Carlo, Domenico Giannone, and Michele Lenza. 2014. “The Financial and 
Macroeconomic Effects of the OMT Announcements.” Centre for Studies in 
Economics and Finance Working Paper 352. 
Antzoulatos, Angelos A. 2012. “Policy Responses to the European Debt Crisis Treating the 
‘Symptoms’ or the ‘Disease’?” Panoeconomicus, 59(5): 529-552. 
Blundell-Wignall, Adrian. 2012. “Solving the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis in 
Europe.” OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2011(2): 1-23. 
Bordo, Michael D. 2004. “The United States as a Monetary Union and the Euro: A Historical 
Perspective.” Cato Journal, 24(1-2): 163-170. 
Bordo, Michael D., Agnieszka Markiewicz, and Lars Jonung. 2011. “A Fiscal Union for 
the Euro: Some Lessons from History.” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 17380. 
Bordo, Michael D., and Harold James. 2013. “The European Crisis in the Context of the 
History of Previous Financial Crisis.” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 19112. 
Claessens, Stijn, M. Ayhan Kose, Luc Laeven, and Fabian Valencia, ed. 2014. Financial 
Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses. Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund. 
Constâncio, Víctor. 2011. “Challenges to Monetary Policy in 2012.” Paper presented at the 
26
th International Conference on Interest Rates, Frankfurt am Main. 
Cour-Thimann, Philippine, and Bernhard Winkler. 2013. “The ECB’s Non-Standard 
Monetary Policy Measures. The Role of Institutional Factors and Financial Structure.” 
European Central Bank Working Paper 1528. 
Crotty, James. 2008. “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical 
Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’.” Political Economy Research 
Institute Working Paper 180. 
Cumming, Christine. 2012. “Managing Crisis without Government Guarantees - How Do 
We Get there?” OECD Journal: Financial Markets Trends, 2011(2): 9-19. 
Dadak, Casimir. 2011. “Political Economy of the Euro Area Crisis.” Panoeconomicus, 
58(Special Issue): 593-604. 
De Grauwe, Paul. 1989. International Money. Post-War Trends and Theories. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
De Grauwe, Paul. 2011. “The European Central Bank: Lender of Last Resort in the 
Government Bond Markets?” Centre for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research Working Paper 3569. 
Dellas, Harris, and George S. Tavlas. 2012. “The Road to Ithaca: The Gold Standard, the 
Euro and the Origins of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis.” Bank of Greece Working 
Paper 149. 
Delong, James B., and Lawrence H. Summers. 2012. “Fiscal Policy in a Depressed 
Economy.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 44(1): 233-297. 
Dombret, Ambreas. 2013. “The European Sovereign Debt Crisis - Past, Present and Future.” 
http://www.bis.org/review/r130827a.pdf. 
Draghi, Mario. 2014. “Unemployment in the Euro Area.” 
http://www.forexlive.com/blog/2014/08/22/full-text-of-draghis-speech/.  
568  António Mendonça 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2014, 5, Special Issue, pp. 543-569 
Eichengreen, Barry, and Peter Temin. 2010. “Fetters of Gold and Paper.” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 26(3): 370-384. 
Fitoussi, Jean-Paul, and Francesco Saraceno. 2010. “Europe: How Deep Is a Crisis? Policy 
Responses and Structural Factors behind Diverging Performances.” Journal of 
Globalization and Development, 1(1): 1-16. 
Guichard, Jean-Paul, and Antoine Brunet. 2009. “Une crise qui n’en finit pas de 
‘rebondir’.” Panoeconomicus, 56(1): 127-133. 
Guðmundsson, Már. 2011. “The Fault Lines in Cross-Border Banking: Lessons from the 
Icelandic Case.” OECD Journal: Financial Markets Trends, 2011(2): 85-93. 
Hein, Eckhard, and Achim Truger. 2014. “Fiscal Policy and Rebalancing in the Euro Area: 
A Critique of the German Debt Brake from a Post-Keynesian Perspective.” 
Panoeconomicus, 61(Special Issue): 21-38. 
Henning, C. Randall, and Martin Kessler. 2012. Fiscal Federalism: US History for 
Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union. Brussels: Bruegel. 
Herndon, Thomas, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin. 2013. “Does High Public Debt 
Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff.” Political 
Economy Research Institute Working Paper 32. 
Herr, Hansjörg. 2014. “The European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve as Lender 
of Last Resort.” Panoeconomicus, 61(Special Issue): 59-78. 
Johnston, Alison, Bob Hancké, and Suman Pant. 2013. “Comparative Institutional 
Advantage in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.” London School of Economics and 
Political Science “Europe in Question” Discussion Paper 66/2013. 
Josifidis, Kosta, Alpar Lošonc, and Novica Supić. 2010. “Neoliberalism: Befall or Respite.” 
Panoeconomicus, 57(1): 101-117. 
Krugman, Paul R. 2012. End this Depression Now! New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
Inc. 
Lane, Philip R. 2012. “The European Sovereign Debt Crisis.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 26(3): 49-68. 
Meade, James E. 1951. The Balance of Payments. Vol. 1, Theory of International Economic 
Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mendonça, António. 2006. “A União Europeia face ao processo de globalização: 
alargamento continental versus abertura atlântica.” In Ensaios de homenagem a 
António Simões Lopes, ed. António Romão, 467-484. Lisboa: ISEG/UTL. 
Mendonça, António. 2008. “A natureza da crise económica actual.” In Crise 2008, ed. 
Horácio Piriquito, 34-38. Lisboa: Bnomics. 
Mendonça, António, João Silvestre, and José Passos. 2011. “The Shrinking Endogeneity of 
Optimum Currency Areas Criteria: Evidence from the European Monetary Union - A 
Beta Regression Approach.” Economics Letters, 113(1): 65-69. 
Mendonça, António. 2012. “As dimensões da crise económica e financeira atual: a economia 
global, a Europa e Portugal.” In Portugal, a Europa e a crise económica e financeira 
internacional, ed. Joaquim Ramos da Silva, 81-158. Lisboa: Almedina. 
Mendonça, António, and José Passos. 2013. “Efeitos das variações dos custos unitários de 
trabalho no dinamismo económico: um estudo econométrico preliminar para 36 países 
da OCDE no período 1993-2009.” In Estudos de homenagem a João Ferreira do 
Amaral, ed. João C. Lopes, 287-302. Coimbra: Almedina.  
569  The European Crisis and Global Economy Dynamics: Continental Enlargement versus Atlantic Opening 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2014, 5, Special Issue, pp. 543-569
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2011. “Financial 
Crisis Management and the Use of Government Guarantees.” OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends, 2011(2). 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2012. Economic 
Policy Reforms 2012: Going for Growth. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Palley, Thomas I. 2014. “The Theory of Global Imbalances: Mainstream Economics vs. 
Structural Keynesianism.” Paper presented at the XI International Colloquium Global 
Crisis and Changes of Paradigms: Current Issues, Brasília. 
Radović, Irena. 2009. “Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Enlarged Monetary Union.” 
Panoeconomicus, 56(1): 95-110. 
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2010. “Growth in a Time of Debt.” 
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 100(2): 573-578. 
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2011. “A Decade of Debt.” National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper 16827. 
Reinhart, Carmen M., Vincent R. Reinhart, and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2012. “Public Debt 
Overhangs: Advanced-Economy Episodes since 1800.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 26(3): 69-86. 
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2014. “Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis: 
Some Lessons Learned and those Forgotten.” In Financial Crisis: Causes, 
Consequences and Policy Responses, ed. Stijn Claessens, M. Ayhan Kose, Luc 
Laeven, and Fabian Valencia, 141-156. Washington, DC: International Monetary 
Fund. 
Shambaugh, Jay C. 2012. “The Euro’s Three Crises.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 44(1): 157-231. 
Swan, Trevor. 1963. “Long-Run Problems of the Balance of Payments.” In The Australian 
Economy: A Volume of Readings, ed. Heinz W. Arndt and Warner M. Corden, 384-
395. Melbourn: Cheshire Press. 
Teulings, Coen, and Richard Baldwin, ed. 2014. Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and 
Cures. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research Press. 
Uxó, Jorge, Jesús Paúl, and Eladio Febrero. 2011. “Current Account Imbalances in the 
Monetary Union and the Great Recession: Causes and Policies.” Panoeconomicus, 
58(Special Issue): 571-592. 
Yellen, Janet L. 2014. “Labor Market Dynamics and Monetary Policy.” 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140822a.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 